


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# SPECIAL REPORT

THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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### THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY

Fidel Castro recently took the first significant steps to formalize the authority of Cuba's Communist party on the national level. By creating a political bureau, a secretariat, and five standing committees within a 100-man central committee--thus generally following the Soviet model--Castro made it clear that the party will be entrusted with a wide range of powers. As a result his regime will become even more institutionalized.

Between 28 September and 3 October, Castro declared that the drafting of Cuba's "socialist" constitution is beginning, announced the formation of the new national party organs, changed the party's name to the Cuban Communist Party, and said that its first national congress will be held sometime late next year.

The party, which had been known for about three years as the United Party of the Socialist Revolution, is the smallest of the ruling Communist parties. Its 50,000 members are drawn from an elite core of Castro's most militant supporters and are therefore intrinsically loyal to him and obediently responsive to the regime policies. With most of its representation from the Cuban masses, however, the party is grounded more in unsophisticated adulation for Fidel Castro than in any overriding attachment to Communist ideological tenets.

#### The Central Committee

Fidel and Raul Castro continue as first and second secretaries, and Armando Hart, formerly the minister of education, has moved up to the third slot in the party hierarchy as its secretary of organization. President Dorticos, chairman of the economic committee, is also on both the political bureau and the secretariat. These four will probably control virtually all activities of the party. Their only colleagues on the

eight-man political bureau are four army majors with scant experience in government who were seemingly included to give a strong representation to the military.

The six-man party secretariat will apparently assume wide responsibilities for administering policies set by the political bureau. Most of its members are able political technicians with long government experience. Both Blas Roca and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, veteran

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Communists and able organizers, are members. Raul Castro, who heads the secretariat, is the only military representative.

Most of the responsibilities allocated to the five standing committees within the central committee concern matters which were not previously under party control. The most significant policy shift is confirmed in the composition of Dorticos' five-man economic committee, which is made up of four other adherents of "liberal" economic principles. The "dogmatist" views espoused by the discredited Ernesto "Che" Guevara no longer have any proponents in the Cuban leadership. Armando Hart is chairman of the education committee, which includes also the new education minister and the head of the party schools.

The new foreign affairs committee is headed by a young revolutionary with little experience in foreign relations rather than by Foreign Minister Raul Roa, who is only the second member. The inclusion of Manuel Pineiro, the head of Cuba's intelligence and subversion service, is apparently meant to emphasize the regime's interest in encouraging "anti-imperialist" revolutions in Latin America and elsewhere. Although the committee will probably begin a reorganization of the Foreign Ministry and assume some of its powers, the conduct of foreign affairs will remain predominantly under the direct control of Fidel Castro and President Dorticos.

The constitutional studies committee is chaired by Blas Roca and includes the justice minister. The committee is charged with drafting Cuba's "socialist" constitution and with establishing a new court and judiciary system patterned after Soviet bloc examples. It may also study changes in the lower party organization and will probably plan the first Cuban Communist party congress.

The revolutionary armed forces and state security committee is headed by Raul Castro and staffed by the interior minister and army chief of staff. About one fourth of the party ranks and two thirds of the central committee members are in the armed forces. By joining together the party and military establishments, the regime is attempting to ensure against a polarization of its two most important bulwarks.

It appears that factionalism in the Cuban leadership is at its lowest point since Castro came to power. The trend toward greater unity, apparent for about a year, is reflected in the wide representation within the central committee. The committee comprises nearly the entire top civilian and military leadership of the Castro regime. Moreover, inclusion of a number of veterans of the pre-Castro party suggests that the conflict between the regime's "old" and "new" Communists now is in large measure a dead issue; in addition to Blas

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Roca and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, more than 15 other important "old" Communists have gained added influence as a result of central committee membership. The bitter disputes which characterized the early years of the party's development appear to have given way to a generally united program.

#### Development of a United Party

In less than five years the party has passed through three distinct organizational phases and has twice changed its name. It was buffeted by a tumultuous power play, underwent a pervasive purge, and finally was completely reconstructed. Through all the changes, however, Fidel Castro has uniformly stated that "the role of the party is to govern." As early as December 1961 he promised that the regime would be institutionalized in a proletarian party.

The development of the united party began in the spring of 1961 when the Integrated Revolutionary Organization (ORI) was formed as an amalgamation of the three political groups which survived the Batista regime: Castro's 26th of July Movement, the Revolutionary Directorate (a student faction), and the pre-Castro Communist Party (PSP). The ORI, however, was formed without a clear definition of its powers or role in the Cuban regime, and in June 1961 Castro revealed that it was to be only the preliminary step in the formation of the United Party of the Socialist Revolution (PURS).

Although various regime officials described the ORI as a Communist party, it pursued a somewhat equivocal course until Fidel Castro publicly espoused Marxism-Leninism in December 1961. During the first year of its organization, therefore, the ORI had no meaningful program, no national executive organ, and no effective party organization.

The "old" Communists of the PSP inevitably dominated the ORI. They were a small and well-organized club of professional politicians--a generation older than the young Castroites. In all of Cuba's six provinces and in most of the municipios (municipal districts), "old" Communists controlled the ORI but continued to express primary loyalty to the PSP leadership. In March 1962 the ORI national directorate was announced, and its 25 members included about an equal number of "old" and "new" Communists. Fidel Castro as first secretary headed a six-man secretariat. It appeared, however, that Castro was no longer in control of the regime and that the PSP was freely implementing its own policies. Tensions mounted as "new" Communists in the regime became increasingly critical of the PSP.

Castro struck at the "old" Communists late in March. He sensationally denounced Anibal Escalante, a prominent PSP leader, for "sectarian tyrannies" and accused him of creating

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"absurd and monstrous" confusion because of his "madness for power." Escalante was removed from his post as organization secretary. Moreover, Castro railed against the "old guard" Communists for squandering political power and forgetting the masses, and initiated a wide-ranging purge to remove the undesirable elements. Escalante was the only "old" Communist removed from the national directorate, but the purge extended to four of the six provincial party chiefs and most of the local bosses, and was not completed until all the party cells were completely reconstituted.

#### Party Reconstruction

The restructuring of the party cells began in May 1962 and continued for about two years while commissions appointed by Castro held nominating assemblies in work centers and state farms throughout the island. A system of popular assemblies, introduced by Castro to generate party cadres among the masses, has been acclaimed by the regime as an important innovation in Communist procedure. At the worker assemblies, "model workers" were selected on the basis of their demonstrated devotion to the regime, and party commissions subsequently selected those suitable for PURS membership. The members of the interim ORI were individually reconsidered but probably at least half of them were purged.

By the end of 1962 the Cuban press was beginning to refer to

the party as the PURS and the transition from the ORI was effected by early 1963 without official notice.

#### The Growth of the PURS

The PURS national directorate was composed at first of the 24 remaining ORI leaders but by late 1964 was reduced to 21. Although it was the party's main organ, its functions were limited mainly to educational and organizational matters and it did not have clearly established responsibilities. The PURS was therefore not a governing party but simply another intermediary stage in developing a ruling Communist party.

For almost three years the PURS slowly augmented its membership and powers as lower party commissions and cells were formed and given a large degree of autonomy. By 1964 the provincial party organizations had been granted extensive supervisory and administrative duties. They continue to function as the centers of authority in the six provinces.

#### Provincial and Local Party Structure

In each of the provinces there now is a party directorate made up of a small secretariat and an executive bureau. The secretary general, the highest provincial officer, is assisted by a secretary of organization who also exercises considerable power. The number of additional members of the provincial

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secretariats varies, but there are usually secretaries for education, finance, and revolutionary orientation. The executive bureau includes the officials in charge of coordinating party activities with the mass organizations and with secondary party organizations.

Regional party directorates were established beginning in 1963 to provide the intermediate structures between the provincial and local levels and to supersede the old municipios. Regional directorates are directly subordinate to the provincial party apparatus and are similarly organized. Their creation was one of the major administrative reforms of the Castro regime. There are 55 regional directorates in Cuba, with between six and thirteen in each province.

Sectional and municipal committees were established to administer and control a varying number of party cells. They generally conform to the organizational pattern of other party committees, but are limited to applying higher party decisions and coordinating cell activities. In late 1964 there were 133 municipal committees and 215 sectional committees. The two committees are similar in structure, the only apparent distinction being the predominance of the municipals in more populous areas.

The party cell or NRA (Nucleo de Revolucionarios Activos) is the lowest party organ and is composed of "militanta" and candidate members. In mid-1964

there were more than 5,000 cells varying in size from five to as many as 200 members. Probably at least half of the members are laborers and farm workers who were chosen as "model workers" by assemblies in their work centers and state farms. The cell has no administrative role. Its primary functions are to mobilize workers and maintain an exemplary work standard.

Party members and candidates pay dues ranging from 1 to 4 percent of their monthly salaries, but they are probably more than compensated through favors and special considerations. Candidates, who share all the responsibilities but none of the benefits of full members, serve a one- to two-year apprenticeship after which they are considered for party membership.

Party committees below the provincial level were "elected" from within their own jurisdiction by sectional and regional assemblies, but from a list of candidates suggested from above. No pattern has been established for provincial assemblies, and provincial party officers continue to be appointed by the national organization.

#### Indoctrination and Education

The committee for revolutionary orientation (COR) is attached to the central committee and apparently supervises and coordinates party indoctrination. It publishes a bulletin at regular intervals and controls the Cuban Institute of Radio Broadcasting, which operates all

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radio and television stations. The COR probably also maintains direct control over the press. Each lower party committee has a COR representative, who Fidel Castro insists "is not a commissar" but a "revolutionary instructor." The COR chairman is Raul Garcia Pelaez, previously the Matanzas Province party chief. Isidoro Malmierca, the former COR chief, now is editor of the party daily, Granma, and will apparently function mainly as its political overseer. It is not clear how COR is related to the new education committee.

The party also maintains an extensive system of more than 250 party schools including the Nico Lopez National Party School, five national schools for the mass organizations, and six provincial centers, as well as day and evening basic schools specifically created to bring revolutionary instruction to peasants and workers. The schools have graduated over 100,000 students and are supervised by the "national directorate of the schools of revolutionary instruction," which is apparently attached to the party's education committee. Courses attempt to relate classical Marxism with the doctrines of the Cuban revolution. The curriculum includes theoretical Communist studies, Cuban history, and the works and speeches of Fidel Castro. Lionel Soto is the head of the schools. The party also stimulates and ensures proper political indoc-

trination in the nation's regular school system by maintaining delegates on provincial and municipal education boards.

#### The Union of Young Communists

The Union of Young Communists (UJC) is the party's youth organization, and its national directorate is guided by the party in grooming the "most exemplary" Cuban youth for party membership. The UJC had its origin in the former Association of Rebel Youth, which changed its name in April 1962 and absorbed five separate youth groups. The UJC claims a membership of about 80,000 and a smaller number of candidates. The regime anticipates a total membership of about 100,000 Cubans between the ages of 14 and 27. The UJC publishes the weekly magazine Mella and a daily newspaper Juventud Rebelde. It controls the Federation of University Students (FEU) and supervises two other organizations for younger Cubans.

The Union of Pioneers (UPC), the junior version of the UJC, was established to organize and indoctrinate children between the ages of six and thirteen. With 70,000 members in mid-1965, it is designed primarily to prepare young Cubans for the UJC and to organize recreational activities. The Union of Secondary Students (UES), formed in August 1962, now has about 75,000 members.

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The Party in the Armed Forces

With more than 10,000 members of the Cuban armed forces also members of the party the military is rapidly forming its own political cadre unswervingly loyal to the regime. Raul Castro has personally supervised the party development in the military by appointing all political instructors and by staffing all party offices with trusted supporters of the regime. In 1964 he said that the military will have the highest percentage of party members in the country because "the armed forces are the political and military vanguard of the revolution."

According to the younger Castro, fully a third of the military will eventually be admitted as full or candidate members of the party and the Union of Young Communists. As armed forces minister and second secretary of the party, Raul Castro is building the regime's largest unified political force within its strongest and most faithful institution.

The organization of the party in the armed forces was initiated in December 1963 with the formation of the first cells in the Army of the East. In September 1964 the process began in the Central Army and a year later in the Western Army.

The navy and air defense forces have also organized party cells.

Military cells are constructed in essentially the same manner as in civilian work centers. The members of a military unit gather in a popular assembly to choose the "model combatants," who are later reviewed by party commissions appointed by Raul Castro. Those accepted form a cell and elect their own officers. There are a few intermediary party structures that coordinate and direct the activities of lower bodies, but the hierarchy is kept weak because military channels maintain the line of command.

Military advisers from the Soviet bloc countries served as consultants and were largely responsible for the party system that has been created in the Cuban armed forces. The party central committee directs the military cadre through Raul Castro's armed forces committee. The principal duties of the military cadres are to drum up support for regime policies, to advance the Communist doctrine, and to provide the example for high military and political performance. In so extensively constructing the party in the armed forces, the Castro regime has taken another important step in assuring its tight hold on power, imitating procedures of the other countries of the Communist bloc.

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Outlook

The accelerated development of the Cuban Communist Party in 1965 reflects several important trends in the political evolution of the Castro regime. The party has assumed wide powers and is clearly meant to function as the regime's inner bureaucracy and to control most affairs of government. Many responsibilities of government ministries will

probably be shifted to the party, but control over the economy, foreign affairs, and education will remain essentially in the hands of the same men. The composition of both party cadres and higher councils indicates that veteran followers of Fidel Castro --many from his 26th of July Movement--have a pre-eminent position. The party, therefore, can probably be expected to remain indefinitely as the personal political machine of Fidel Castro.


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## CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY

### First Secretary



Fidel CASTRO Ruz

### Second Secretary



Raul CASTRO Ruz

### Secretary of Organization



Armando HART Dávalos

### POLITICAL BUREAU

Fidel CASTRO Ruz  
Raul CASTRO Ruz  
Osvaldo DORTICOS Torrado  
Juan ALMEIDA Bosques  
Ramiro VALDES Menendez  
Armando HART Dávalos  
Guillermo GARCIA Fria  
Sergio DEL VALLE Jimenez



DORTICOS

### SECRETARIAT

Raul CASTRO Ruz  
Osvaldo DORTICOS Torrado  
Fidel CASTRO Ruz  
Blas ROCA Calderio  
Faure CHOMON Mediavilla  
Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ

### ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

Osvaldo DORTICOS Torrado  
(Chairman)  
Faure CHOMON Mediavilla  
Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ  
Raul CURBELO Morales  
Joel DOMENECH Benitez

### EDUCATION COMMITTEE

Armando HART Dávalos  
(Chairman)  
Lionel SOTO Prieto  
Jose LLANUSA Gobel

### FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

Osmani CIENFUEGOS Gorriaran  
(Chairman)  
Raul ROA Garcia  
Manuel PINEIRO Losada

### REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES AND STATE SECURITY COMMITTEE

Raul CASTRO Ruz (Chairman)  
Ramiro VALDES Menendez  
Sergio DEL VALLE Jimenez

### CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES COMMITTEE

Blas ROCA Calderio (Chairman)  
Jose NARANJO Morales  
Alfredo YABUR Maluf

Capt. Jose ABRANTES Fernandez  
Maj. Rogelio ACEVEDO Gonzalez  
Maj. Armando AGOSTA Cordero  
Maj. Juan V. ACUNA Nunez  
Severo AGUIRRE Cristo  
Maj. Jose M. ALVAREZ Bravo  
Maj. Efigenio AMEIJERAS Delgado  
Capt. Emilio ARAGONES Navarro  
Capt. Jose ARTEAGA Hernandez  
Maj. Flavio BRAVO Pardo  
Ramon CALCINES Gordillo  
Maj. Julio E. T. CAMACHO Aguilera  
Maj. Lino CARRERAS Rodriguez  
Maj. Ernesto CASILLAS Palenzuela  
Maj. Belarmino CASTILLA Mas  
Maj. Angel Joel CHAVECO Hernandez  
Maj. Leopoldo CINTRAS Fria  
Maj. Abelardo COLOME Ibarra  
Maj. Manuel DIAZ Gonzalez  
Maj. Victor E. DREKE Cruz  
Vilma ESPIN Guillot de Castro  
Maj. Manuel E. FAJARDO Sotomayor  
Marcelo FERNANDEZ Font  
Maj. Oscar FERNANDEZ Mell  
Maj. Harold FERRER Martinez  
Maj. Calixto GARCIA Martinez  
Maj. Julio A. GARCIA Olivera

Maj. Pedro M. GARCIA Pelaez  
Raul GARCIA Pelaez  
Elena GIL Izquierdo  
Fabio GROBART  
Maj. Raul GUERRA Bermejo  
Maj. Orestes GUERRA Gonzalez  
Secundino GUERRA Hidalgo  
Maj. Joel IGLESIAS Leyva  
Maj. Omar H. ISER Mojena  
Maj. Renerio JIMENEZ Lage  
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Manuel LUZARDO Garcia  
Maj. Jose R. MACHADO Ventura  
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Arnaldo MILIAN Castro  
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Maj. Arnaldo OCHOA Sanchez  
Maj. Mario OLIVA Perez  
Maj. Filiberto OLVERA Moya

Maj. Ramon PARDO Guerra  
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Capt. Antonio PEREZ Herrero  
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Ursinio ROJAS Sanhiesaban  
Maj. Antonio SANCHEZ Diaz  
Celia SANCHEZ Manculay  
Maj. Aldo SANTAMARIA Cuadrado  
Haydee SANTAMARIA Cuadrado de Hart  
Maj. Rene de los SANTOS Ponce  
Clementina SERRA Robledo  
Maj. Jose R. SILVA Barroa  
Maj. Eddy SUNOL Ricardo  
Lt. Julio TARRAU Castillo  
Maj. Diocles TORRALBAS Gonzalez  
Felipe TORRES Trujillo  
Capt. Anibal VELAZ Suarez  
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Maj. Luis A. ZAYAS Ochoa

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